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I.  Introduction  
This discussion will consider how different courts deal with difficult cases, and how courts 
seek to maintain the legitimacy of their judicial authority.  How do courts search for 
legitimacy?  From what sources do they draw their legitimacy? As a central example I will 
use the problem often referred to as the “wrongful life” cases: can a medical care provider be 
held liable for negligent malpractice that results in the creation or preservation of a life that is 
not considered worth living?  This question touches upon the autonomy of the plaintiff.  By 
comparing three judicial decisions in “wrongful life” cases from courts from the United 
States, France and the Netherlands I hope to illustrate different possible sources of judicial 
legitimacy.   
As early as 1982 the Supreme Court of California had to decide a wrongful life case 
(Turpin v. Sortini).1 The case was about two sisters– ironically named Hope and Joy Turpin – 
who both suffered from a hereditary hearing defect which robbed them of their hearing.  Due 
to an incorrect diagnosis of Hope’s hearing problems, the parents had already conceived Joy 
before they found out about the true condition of Hope.  They would not have wanted a 
second child had they known in advance that she too would suffer from this hereditary 
hearing defect.  Can the doctor, Sortini, be held liable for the wrongful life of Joy?  The court 
answered the question negatively on the ground that the damage cannot be determined in any 
                                                 
1 Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220; 643 P.2d 954.  
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rational or reasoned fashion.  That would involve comparison of the Joyce’s present condition 
with the situation as it would be if she did not exist at all, which is – as the court 
acknowledged – “outside the realm of human competence.” On the same ground, the court 
did sustain the claim for extraordinary expenses for specialised teaching, training and hearing 
equipment during her lifetime. 
The French Cour de cassation twice addressed the wrongful life issue, both in the same 
case of Nicolas Perruche.2 This case concerns a boy whose mother is infected with Rubella 
during her pregnancy, which led to serious neurological problems for her son (deafness, 
partial blindness, and a heart condition; symptoms of the so-called Gregg syndrome). The 
mother was wrongly diagnosed, which deprived her of the option of aborting her child (as she 
claims she would have chosen to do).  Though the appeal court had decided that the doctor 
and the laboratory could not be held liable because there was no causal connection between 
their wrongdoing and the claimed damage (since that was the result of the Rubella infection), 
the Cour de cassation overturned that decision and sent the case to another appeal court.  
This court also decided that the required causal link was missing and the case was again put 
before the Cour de cassation.  In the second Nicolas Perruche decision, the Cour ruled that 
due to the negligence of the doctor and the laboratory the mother was deprived of the option 
of having her child aborted, and that the defendants could be held liable for that wrongdoing.  
After a fierce public debate, the legislator prohibited wrongful life claims across the board; 
damage can only be compensated when this damage is a direct consequence of medical 
malpractice. 
Only last year the Dutch Hoge Raad was confronted with a wrongful life case3, During her 
pregnancy, the mother consulted her midwife because there were two cases of handicaps due 
                                                 
2 Cour de cassation, Nicolas Perruche 1 and 2 (26 marche 1996, D. 1997, Jur. P. 35, 17 novembre 2000, D. 2001, Jur. P. 332). 
3 Hoge Raad 18 maart 2005, LJN:AR5213 
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to a chromosome disorder in her husband’s family.  The midwife did not think it necessary to 
investigate the matter any further.  This was later considered a professional failure with 
dramatic effects.  Once born, baby Kelly turned out to have both mental and physical 
handicaps from which she suffered severely.  The parents claimed damage – both on their 
own accord and in the name of Kelly – and their claims were sustained by both the appeal 
court and the Hoge Raad.  The Hoge Raad not only addressed the legal issues but also 
considered moral and pragmatic arguments that had been put forward against wrongful life 
claims.  First, there is the moral opposition that sustaining these claims violates the principle 
of the dignity of human life, which acknowledges that having not been born is preferable to 
living in a condition like this.  Second, there is the pragmatic argument that sustaining claims 
like this will tempt doctors to practice “defensive medicine” to avoid serious risk.  Both 
arguments were carefully examined and rejected.  The decision has been well accepted by the 
general public. 
Here we have three cases of “wrongful life”, decided by three different courts, in different 
ways on different grounds.  As I already conceded, I will not go into the details of the 
arguments for and against wrongful life claims, but instead address the question of how 
courts search for legitimacy in difficult questions.  Only recently Mitchell Lasser published 
an interesting book in which he compared the Cour de cassation, the US Supreme Court and 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ), thus drawing experience from different legal systems.4  
What I find attractive in his approach is the fact that he combines the discursive and the 
institutional dimensions of the courts under investigation, showing us connections which 
were heretofore unnoticed.  Lasser’s analysis however, does not, recognize the functional 
dimension of the courts, which is an important third element in their relation to legitimacy.  
                                                 
4 Lasser, Mitchel, Judicial Deliberations: A Comparative Analysis of Judicial Transparency and Legitimacy. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004. 
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This concerns the  actual role that courts play in the legal order and in society at large.  The 
most effective frame of analysis will give due attention to three different dimensions of 
legitimacy: the discursive, the institutional, and the functional dimensions of legitimacy (or, 
in other words, the argumentative, organizational, and social aspects of legitimacy).  The 
specific arrangements that are responsible for the legitimacy of a specific court can be 
analyzed as specific combinations of discursive, institutional and functional variables.  To 
illustrate this hypothesis I will elaborate on the examples introduced, replacing for general 
purposes the Supreme Court of California by the US Supreme Court (since the differences are 
not relevant in this context). 
 
II. Two opposites: Cour de cassation and US Supreme Court 
A. Cour de cassation 
It is not unusual among comparatists to present the French Cour de cassation and the US 
Supreme Court as opposites.5 The Cour de cassation is held to be rather formalistic, because 
of its short decisions, which are syllogistic in structure and magisterial in tone.  The US 
Supreme Court, on the other hand, is considered to be pragmatic, because of its extensively 
personally and politically motivated decisions.  These differences are there, not to be ignored, 
but the picture is more complex than this simple opposition suggests.  Lasser relativizes this 
opposition from both sides.  On closer inspection it seems rather unfair to depict the French 
judiciary as formalistic. In addition to the formal-seeming structured judicial decisions, there 
is an unofficial discourse which is constituted by the opinions of the Advocates General, the 
annotations of legal scholars, and the reports of the reporting magistrates.6  Though the 
results of this discourse are discussed in a public hearing and not always published, it is here 
                                                 
5 For the background of the respective different legal systems I recommend Glenn, H. Patrick. Legal Traditions of the World. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
6 Supra n. 4. 
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that the real debate takes place.  In this (partly) hidden discourse an intense debate is taking 
place concerning equity, substantive justice, and the contemporary needs of society.  This 
debate is channelled through the recognized legal forms, such as precedents, interpretations, 
and the opinions of scholars, but is in reality an open-ended, equity-oriented and personal 
debate, in which all the arguments that are lacking in the official discourse are exchanged.  
As such, it provides a necessary complement to the official discourse, which could not exist 
in the form that it does without the sheltered debate in the unofficial discourse.  The 
unofficial discourse provides the insights, arguments and points of view, on the basis of 
which the Cour de cassation makes its laconic decisions.  These authorized interpretations of 
law reappear in the decisions in their typical formalized, syllogistic, and ritualized forms. 
Actually, it is the established division of labour between the two spheres of discourse that 
makes the system work, attributing the real debate to the unofficial discourse, and reserving 
the authorized decision-making to the Cour itself.  This advances the efficiency of the system 
by making it possible for the Cour de cassation (162 judges and 27 Advocates- General) to 
deal with a caseload of 30, 000 to 35, 000 cases a year.7 
But does the Cour de cassation also serve the legitimacy of the system?  From what sources 
does the court draw its legitimacy?  The French system draws mainly from institutional 
sources to generate judicial legitimacy.8 Lasser explains that the judicial system is firmly 
anchored in the political system by which French society shapes itself.  Several of these 
anchors can be mentioned.  First, there is the strict separation of the judicial system from the 
political system, secured by the separation of powers, the theory of sources of law which 
secures the supremacy of legislation, and a methodology of strict law application.  Of course 
this separation is backed by a rather positivistic legal theory, in which a strict division is 
                                                 
7 www.courdecassation.fr (L’activité de la Cour, statistique année 2004). The 162 judges, 27 advocates general, and 18 legal 
writers, are divided over 6 chambers: 3 civil chambers, 1 commercial, 1 social, and 1 criminal chamber. 
8 Supra n. 4.  
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maintained between the domain of facts and that of the values.9 Second, there is a state-
formed elite of magistrates (and law professors, for that matter), selected and educated on a 
meritocratic basis.  They form, so to speak, the human flesh on the skeleton of the judicial 
system.  Thirdly, this elite has a republican ethos of service to the state, in the name of the 
general public interest.  This ethos presupposes a right answer to difficult legal questions 
which can be discussed, discovered and authoritatively given by the state-formed elite of 
judges and magistrates (reminiscent of Plato’s “philosopher-kings”).10  
This socio-institutional arrangement has provided judicial legitimacy thus far, as Lasser 
shows, but it can be questioned whether it will continue to do so in the foreseeable future.  To 
explain this we have to take his analysis beyond the discursive and institutional level to 
consider the functional aspects of legitimacy.  This perspective reveals three possible risks for 
the French answer to the question of judicial legitimacy.  The first is that the separation of the 
judicial and the political system is increasingly difficult to uphold in modern West-European 
legal systems.11 As Guarnieri and Pederzoli have shown in an extensive comparative study, 
the judiciary plays an increasingly important political role, which raises new issues of 
legitimacy (such as “who guards the guardians?”).12 This places the judge in West-European 
legal systems, including France, more in the forefront of controversial political issues.  
The second risk is that in a pluralistic society it is increasingly difficult to build legitimacy 
on a shared conception of substantive justice, to be discovered by a legal elite.  This is true 
not only because people are becoming less inclined to put trust in legal elites, but also 
                                                 
9 This was the prevailing legal theory in the days of the formation of the Code Civil (1804), which is up until this day the most 
important legal source for the Cour de cassation and the French judiciary in general.  
10 Supra n. 4. 
11 The same applies to its different parts, such as the separation of powers, the methodology of law application and the 
positivistic separation of facts and law. 
12 Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli. The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of Courts and Democracy. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002. 
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because substantive justice gives way to procedural justice.  What is considered to be the 
right outcome of legal proceedings is not so much the right answer, in any objective sense, 
but rather the result of a fair trial in which all parties have had their due.  Finally, it has been 
noticed that citizens in modern society put their trust less in input-legitimacy, and turn 
increasingly to output-legitimacy.13 If this is true, it means that judicial legitimacy depends 
less on factors such as institutional independence or the selection, recruitment and training of 
judges, than it does on factors like the quality of the proceedings, decisions, motivations, 
communication, and the like.  It is the performance of the judiciary that counts, rather than its  
position in society. Of course, this relativizes the French institutional answer to the question 
of legitimacy.  
 
B. US Supreme Court 
Let us turn now to the other extreme and the US Supreme Court.  The US system is 
characterized by a unified, integrated discourse in the form of the judicial opinion.  These 
opinions are well known for their anti-formalism.  This is illustrated by the decisions of the 
US Supreme Court.  The sheer length of the decisions – which can take some 20 or more 
pages – suggests an extensive argumentation in a dialogical form.  Characteristic of these 
decisions is a heavily fact-oriented analysis, in which the judges devote considerable effort to 
describing the factual circumstances of the case.  This is not just a starting point for the 
application of the law, but also as an exemplification of a realistic orientation in the law, in 
which legal consequences depend largely on their purposes and effects.  The consequences of 
the decisions, more than the court’s rationale, seem to be the determining factor in the 
decision-making process.  This is all written down in a very personal style, in which the legal 
                                                 
13 Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (WRR), De toekomst van onze nationale rechtsstaat, The Hague 2002, p. 
110. 
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ethos of the judge can easily be recognized.  The individual judicial responsibility is 
strengthened, of course, by the personal signature of the judge under the majority decision, as 
well as by the possibility of concurring and dissenting opinions.  Each judge is accountable 
for both his or her personal decisions as well as for his or her arguments in each individual 
decision.  Therefore it is in the first place the judge speaking, not the court or the judiciary.14 
On the other hand, the opinion transcends sheer pragmatism, because policy arguments are 
channelled through formal means, such as judicial tests, rules of thumb, legal principles, 
precedents, and the like.  To accuse an American judge of engaging in politics is as serious a 
criticism as to blame him or her of formalism.  
The Supreme Court is notorious for its ethos of independence.  President Eisenhower 
famously stated: “During my presidency I have made two mistakes, and they are both sitting 
in the Supreme Court”. This illustrates the extent which the Supreme Court (unlike the Cour 
de cassation) plays an outspoken political role through its power of constitutional review.15  
The discourse in which the judiciary participates can be characterized as both anti-formalistic 
and anti-policy, or – the other way around – it has both formal and pragmatic aspects.  The 
judicial discourse is largely an autonomous one, which constitutes a separated interpretive, 
argumentative, hermeneutic discourse.16  
From what sources does the Supreme Court draw its legitimacy?  The Supreme Court 
draws mainly from discursive sources to generate judicial legitimacy.17 Several anchors 
embed this practice firmly in the judicial system, as Lasser shows.  First, there is the doctrine 
of case law, which supplies each judicial decision with a recognized legal purpose.  In that 
                                                 
14 The high profile of the nine judges of the Supreme Court is illustrated by their curricula on the Supreme Court’s website.  (see 
www.supremecourtus.gov ) 
15 Which in France is attributed to the Conseil constitutionnel. 
16 Which deals with an increasing caseload: 1460 cases on the docket in 1945, 2313 in 1960, and more than 7000 nowadays (see 
www.supremecourtus.gov).  
17 Supra n. 4.. 
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sense, the legislator and the judiciary are “partners in the business of law.” The emphasis is 
not so much on the doctrine of the separation of powers, as it is on the balance of powers 
(“checks and balances”).  Second, there is the theory and practice of explaining and justifying 
case law by argumentative means, to an ever-increasing level of detail.  This contributes not 
only to the understanding and acceptance of the decision by the parties, but also to a context 
of judicial accountability and transparency towards society at large.  In broader terms, this 
“good reasons approach” serves both an informational and educational purpose, and forms an 
exemplary illustration of what judicial decision-making and responsibility can and should be.  
The discourse of the Supreme Court is an integrated discourse with a plurivocal cacophonic 
sound, since each judge has his or her own voice.  This system exemplifies the ideas of 
practical rationality and procedural justice in a democratic system, showing that there is not 
one right answer (to be discovered and authorized by a judiciary elite), but that there are 
several options that can be defended on good grounds.  In a democratic society this seems 
preferable, simply because more people recognize their views and convictions in the 
motivations of the courts.  
Are there no drawbacks for the American system then?  According to Lasser there are, 
because there is no alternative discourse as in France.18 There are no Advocate Generals 
opinions and the academic commentary is banished to the law reviews.  This may be a trivial 
difference because there is enough opportunity for difference of opinion within this integrated 
discourse itself (as through the possibility of concurring and dissenting opinions).  Again the 
analysis must be taken a step further to understand the real problem which arises from the 
vulnerability of judicial discourse in relation to political influence.  The ongoing debate on 
judicial restraint or activism shows permanent awareness of the political role of the Supreme 
Court.  This is reflected in the political character of the appointment of judges in the Supreme 
                                                 
18 Supra n. 4. 
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Court.  Because of this, the independence of the judges is dependent on their ethos, which is 
not a very strong safeguard.  The case of Bush vs. Gore illustrated this problem by dividing 
the Supreme Court along party lines. This reveals how important it is that judicial discourse 
remains firmly rooted in a strong institutional setting.  While the Supreme Court is strong in 
discursive sources of legitimacy, it is weak in institutional sources. The Cour de cassation is 
just the opposite.  From this perspective, they are mirror images of each other. 
 
C. The European courts as in-betweens  
1.  European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
Similar analysis can be extended to the European courts.  From this standpoint both the 
European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights take an in-between 
position between the opposites already discussed, but each in a different way.  The ECJ is 
characterized by Lasser as a hybrid which originated as an offspring of its model, the Cour de 
cassation, but with Anglo-American overtones.19 As in the French example, the ECJ 
encompasses two discursive spheres: the official discourse of the decisions of the ECJ and the 
unofficial sphere of the opinions of the Advocate Generals and the annotations of legal 
commentators.  As in the French case, the distinction is based on a division of labour between 
authoritative decision-making and substantive debate.  The rulings of the ECJ are the result of 
collegial decision making. They suggest  logical compulsion and are written in an impersonal 
style.  Lasser stresses that they differ from the decisions of the Cour de cassation, however, 
in that they use purposive arguments in considering the EU treaties as a whole, seeking to 
advance the effectiveness of community law, the requirements of legal certainty and 
uniformity, the legal protection of individual community rights, and finally: the system of the 
                                                 
19 The ECJ consists of 25 judges (1 per member state of the EU) and 8 Advocate Generals, organised in chambers of 3 or 5 
judges, or a grand chamber of 13 judges.  In 2004, they dealt with 665 cases, 531 new ones, and 840 pending (in 2000: 526, 503, 
and 873 respectively) (see www.curia.eu.int ).  The court of first instance is not taken into consideration. 
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treaty.  Thus, the ECJ tries to improve the French example on the discursive level, by 
allowing for more extensive motivations.  In this respect, the ECJ resembles the US Supreme 
Court, but there is a fundamental difference.  Because of the dialogue with precedents and its 
factual character, the motivation behind the decisions of the US Supreme Court reaches an 
ever-increasing level of detail, while the motivations of the ECJ remain at a rather abstract 
level.  This reflects the different responsibility of the ECJ which is to build a legal system on 
the provisions of the Treaties.  As Tim Koopmans writes: “The Court had to feel its way.  It 
did so by deriving some basic rules from the multiplicity of technical provisions, by 
interpreting these rules in the light of the aims of the treaty, and by slowly developing a 
system of case law on that foundation.”20 
Bengoetxea has drawn a similar, but more precise picture than Lasser.  The ECJ is in his 
words “very Dworkinian”, “taking the European Community project seriously and making 
the best and most coherent story of European integration which is embodied in that 
project”.21 The ECJ makes use of different kinds of methods of interpretation and reasoning, 
mainly (i) semiotic or linguistic arguments (divergence between different language versions, 
ordinary language), (ii) systematic and contextual  arguments (in situations of gap or 
antinomy: the sedes materiae argument and quasilogical arguments such as the argument per 
analogiam, a fortiori, a pari, lex specialis, lex superior, a contrario, conceptual arguments, 
and teleo-systematic arguments), and (iii) teleological, functional or consequentialist 
arguments (the apagogic argument, the weighing and balancing of principles, policy 
arguments).22 In general, preference is given to systematic-functional criteria (“a systematic-
                                                 
20 Koopmans, Tim. Courts and Political Institutions: A Comparative View. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 
89. 
21 Bengoetxea, Joxerramon. The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice: Towards a European Jurisprudence. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993. p. vi and 99. 
22 See Id at 233-270. 
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cum-dynamic-interpretation”), as is shown for example in the ruling in the case of Van Gend 
and Loos (in which the object of the Treaty and article 177 justify the conclusion that 
Community law has an authority which can be invoked by their nationals, from which it 
follows that if the Treaty imposes obligations on individuals and Member States, it must also 
confer rights on individuals).  The frequent appeal to the system of the Treaties and the aims 
they pursue makes us aware that “in doing so the Court is engaging in a special form of social 
action, furthering the aims of the Treaties by recourse to dynamic criteria and reconstructing 
the EC law into a coherent and consistent whole by recourse to systematic criteria”.23 This is 
done in favour of the overall objective of obtaining legitimacy for the EC and its law: “Using 
contextual and systematic criteria of interpretation can thus be seen as a form of social action 
whereby the Court seeks to obtain legitimacy and adherence to a body of norms”.24  The 
sought-after legitimacy extends not only to the law of the EC, but also to its institutions, 
including the Court itself: “The relevance of the Court’s justification of its own decisions lies 
in the attempt to achieve legitimacy amongst the audiences to which such justifications are 
addressed.  The making legitimate of the European Community idea of an ever closer union 
is thus an internal process assumed by the judges of the ECJ before their audiences”.25  From 
this we can conclude that the discursive legitimacy the ECJ seeks to establish in its rulings is 
closely connected to the formation of the European community as a whole and the process of  
European integration.  Recent developments have shown that this makes the ECJ vulnerable 
when the project of European integration becomes unpopular or even suspect for the general 
public.  At the end of the day, the legitimacy of the ECJ shares the fate of that of the other EU 
institutions and even of the political process of European integration, embedded as it is in the 
institutions and the formation of the European Community. 
                                                 
23 See id. at  234. 
24 See id. at 98. 
25 See id. at 99. 
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2. European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
Although the ECHR had to build a legal discourse from scratch, as did the ECJ, the 
starting-point was rather different.  In the wording of Tim Koopmans: “The provisions of the 
European Convention are not very technical, but rather general and vague.  In order to make 
the provisions workable, the European Court had to break them up into three or four ‘sub-
standards’ which were practicable and which could, in their turn, lead to further 
ramifications”.26  The ECHR succeeded in creating a lively and effective discourse on human 
rights, and the question arises how this can be explained.  One of the explanations is perhaps 
that the human rights discourse of the ECHR is, in terms of Lasser, a unified discursive 
context.  The majority decisions of the Court, dealing with the alleged violation of one of the 
provisions of the European treaty on human rights, speak with one voice.  They are the result 
of collegial decision-making and are formulated in an impersonal tone (“the Court”).  The 
rulings of the court are rather long, containing extensive descriptions of the procedure, the 
facts (the circumstances of the case and the relevant domestic law), and the law (the 
applicants complaints, the alleged violations, and the court’s assessment), resulting in the 
decision.  Debate is stimulated by the possibility of concurring and (jointly or partly) 
dissenting opinions, which display a more personal tone (such as “I”, “we” and “in my 
view”) arguing why the majority decision is supposed to be wrong.  There is no institute such 
as the Advocate Generals advising the court, but there is a lively tradition of legal scholars 
discussing the case law of the Court, both on a national and an international level.  All in all, 
the discourse organizes a rather lively discussion on the meaning and extension of the human 
rights provisions of the treaty. 
                                                 
26 Supra n.20. 
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The ECHR owes its legitimacy partly to the transparency and the accountability of its 
rulings..  If the ECJ can be characterized as “a Dworkinian Court”, then the ECHR surely 
can.  In building a human rights discourse on the basis of a single treaty, Koopmans writes, 
“the European Court thereby explicitly accepted the idea of legal evolution in the area of 
human rights protection, and the role of the judiciary in drawing conclusions from it.  That 
attitude may have contributed to the more or less activist character of much of the European 
Court’s case law”.27 Only recently the ECHR confirmed its conviction that the Treaty is a 
living document, to be interpreted in the light of present-day opinions.28 Although it has been 
said that the ECJ too plays an activist role, there is a notable difference. Starting in the 
economic area, the ECJ has built a new legal system of a somewhat technocratic nature, 
which has not attracted a lot of public attention.29 The ECHR on the other hand, created a 
discourse on human rights with remarkable results, which did arouse a lot of public attention 
and support.  Besides, the case law of the ECHR has proved to be a vehicle for social, legal 
and political change in most of the members of the Council of Europe.  The case law of the 
ECHR has initiated major legal reforms in the Member States, in private law, criminal law, as 
well as in administrative law.  The ECHR can be addressed by individual citizens when all 
national legal means are exhausted, which makes the court very accessible for individual 
citizens and activist lawyers.  This, more than anything else, has contributed to the legitimacy 
of the ECHR.  The success of the ECHR can be measured by the enormous growth in the 
case load, which increased from some 5,979 cases in 1998 to 13,858 cases in 2001.30 
Proposals for judicial reform are in discussion now, intended to rescue the court from its own 
success.  Another risk is that certain Member States of the Council of Europe have developed 
                                                 
27 Surpa n.20.  
28 ECHR 13 July 2004, nr. 69498/01, NJ 2005, 508. 
29 Supra n. 21. 
30 European Court of Human Rights, informatienoot van de griffier 2004, p.3 (see www.echr.coe.int ).  
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an attitude of non-compliance to the rulings of the court (most notably Russia).  This could 
weakens the court’s legitimacy.  Lastly, it should be noticed that the input-legitimacy of the 
ECHR is rather weak.  The judges are appointed from the 45 Member States by the 
Parliamentary Assembly, for a period of 6 years.31 For both the ECJ and the ECHR the idea 
and practice of national representation makes the legitimacy of the courts vulnerable.  In hard 
cases citizens could respond to the rulings of both European courts with the question: why 
should we accept a ruling that is given by some politically appointed judges from until 
recently unknown countries?  The future will teach us whether the European courts can afford 
to ignore this criticism or whether institutional reform will be necessary.  
 
4. The Dutch Hoge Raad  
Let us return to the national courts, in this case the Dutch Hoge Raad.  As in the cases of 
the ECJ and the ECHR, the Hoge Raad can be characterized as falling in-between the two 
extremes, in the sense that it draws its legitimacy both from institutional and discursive 
factors.  Let us examine them individually.  On the institutional level, the Hoge Raad is 
comparable to the Cour de cassation and is in fact, historically, a copy of the French system.  
Both are courts of cassation in civil and criminal cases, dealing only with questions of law 
(not questions of fact). As such they are not to be understood as third instance courts (next to 
the courts of first instance and the appellate courts), but rather as offering a form of judicial 
review (checking whether the law is correctly applied).  “The principal role of a Supreme 
Court is to give authoritative rulings on the law”, John Bell writes, and as such they fulfil a 
national role (distinct from the regional role of appeal courts).32  In this line the primary 
                                                 
31 There are 45 judges; one judge for each party to the treaty. They are organised in 4 sections formed for 3 years, each of which 
contains committees of 3 judges for 1 year.  Additionally, there are chambers of 7 judges, and the grand chamber of 17 judges 
(www.echr.coe.int).  
32 Bell, John. Reflections on Continental European Supreme Courts.  Legal Studies (2004) 160. 
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responsibility of the Hoge Raad is to serve the uniformity of the legal system, for which task 
it is given a position at the top of the judicial hierarchy for civil and criminal adjudication 
(administrative adjudication is attributed to another hierarchy with the Council of State at the 
top).  In playing this unifying role the Hoge Raad fulfils two other functions attributed by 
law, namely the legal protection of the parties involved, and the creation of law. This last 
function requires more explanation since according to the doctrine of the separation of 
powers (Trias Politica) it is supposed to be the legislature which makes the law, and the 
judiciary that applies the law.  In the Netherlands this doctrine of the separation of powers is 
less strictly applied than in France, since it is an acknowledged fact that judicial lawmaking is 
both necessary (interpretation involves the creation of new law) and desirable (judicial 
lawmaking keeps the law up to date).  This more flexible approach to the relation between the 
legislature and the judiciary – more as a balance of powers than as a separation of powers – is 
completed with a less positivistic, more hermeneutic approach by judges.  The Hoge Raad 
and in fact the judiciary as a whole, is seen as being engaged in the interpretation of evolving 
law in individual cases, which involves the mutual adjustment of facts and norms.  This 
picture was already sketched by an influential pre-war Dutch scholar (Paul Scholten), and it 
resembles the Dworkinian picture of judicial adjudication far better than the positivistic 
model.33 
As a result, the case law of the Hoge Raad is de facto a source of law, in the sense that is in 
fact authoritative for other courts (not de iure since it is not legally binding).  Both the Hoge 
Raad itself and the lower courts tend to follow its case law, both on legal grounds (equality) 
and for pragmatic purposes (saving parties the trouble of cassation).  Though the doctrine of 
stare decisis is not formally in place in the Netherlands, adjudication can be regarded as an 
ongoing dialogue with precedents.  In this dialogue, not only the Hoge Raad and the lower 
                                                 
33 Scholten, Paul. Algemeen Deel. Zwolle 1974(2). 
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courts play their part, but also the Advocates General with their conclusions in each case in 
cassation and the legal scholars with their annotations.  The distinction Lasser makes between 
the official discourse of the rulings of the court and the unofficial discourse of the 
conclusions and annotations is to be made in the Dutch context as well, though less strictly.  
As we saw, in France the substantial debate takes place in unofficial discourse, while the 
Cour de cassation presents its authoritative choice from among the discussed alternatives in a 
syllogistic form and in a magisterial tone.  In the Netherlands, the division of labour between 
the official and the unofficial discourse is somewhat more vague, because the Hoge Raad 
plays an active role in the discussion of matters of substantial justice, equity and social needs.  
Its reasoning contains interpretive arguments and deliberations made on moral grounds and 
with regard to the factual consequences.  
The case of baby Kelly provides a useful illustration, since in its ruling the court addressed 
legal arguments, the principle of the dignity of human life, and the possible consequences of 
the decision itself (see paragraph 1).  This took some 12 pages, next to the 28 pages of the 
conclusion of the Procurar General.  One can say that the Hoge Raad – in comparison with 
the Cour de cassation – has improved both the quality and quantity of its reasoning.  In this 
ambition to improve on its reasoning the Hoge Raad resembles more the US Supreme Court 
than the Cour de cassation.  In other words, in its output the Hoge Raad aspires to emulate 
the American example, while its input continues to reflect its French origin.  This is the 
characteristic middle position of the Hoge Raad, between two opposites.   
5. Comparing the wrongful life cases 
This comparison of French, American, European, and Dutch courts establishes a 
perspective from which to examine the “wrongful life” cases.  Apart from its outcome, the 
Supreme Court of California ruling is the most convincing.  It is a reasoned reflection on the 
precedents available, the legislation at hand and the principles involved, with a due regard for 
 18
the choices left to be made.  It is clear in the questions to be answered (“This case presents 
the question of whether a child born with an hereditary affliction may maintain a tort action 
against a medical care provider who – before the child’s conception – negligently failed to 
advise the child’s parents of the possibility of the hereditary condition, depriving them of the 
opportunity to choose not to conceive the child”) and it is cautious in the policies accepted 
(“we cannot assert with confidence that in every situation there would be a societal consensus 
that life is preferable to never having been born at all”). It is directed to the parties involved 
and the public at large and it is written in comprehensible language (here and there even in a 
literary style).  It reflects differences of opinion by the simultaneous publication of 
concurring and dissenting opinions, thus showing that the plurality of opinions in society on 
such a complicated moral issue is reflected within the court, though on higher legal ground.  
As mentioned before, this does more justice to the ideas of practical reason and procedural 
justice than the alternative: one authorized opinion, arrived at through voting in chambers.   
The first approach is more convincing, as it signals that the ruling is convincing because it 
rests on solid grounds, not because it is delivered by a specific court.  As such, the ruling is 
an example of horizontal authority, not of vertical authority.  This is more effective in a 
society where the authority of institutions is no longer taken for granted, but has to be earned 
on each occasion of performance.  Are there no drawbacks then for the methods of California 
Supreme Court?  I think there are, but they cannot be read from the court’s rulings.  As we 
mentioned in the context of the US Supreme Court, they are of an institutional nature.  
Though there are different procedures for the appointment of judges in state courts and in 
federal courts, they are both politically influenced.  This makes these courts vulnerable, 
perhaps not so much to political influence (which is tempered by the judicial ethos of 
independence), as to the more indirect influence of political criticism (which is hard to 
redress).  
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Compare this picture with the French approach in the cases of Nicolas Perruche.  In very 
short, syllogistically structured rulings the Cour de cassation “dictated” its decision. This 
decision was far less convincing.  We can hardly find any reasons for the decision that the 
causal connection between the tort and the damage was not lacking, nor is there substantial 
deliberation on precedents and principles.  What we do find is an unclear structure in which 
deliberations are tied to means of cassation (“moyen des cassation”), deliberations are put in 
the indirect mode (“Que…”), and where the decision is delivered (not reasoned).  It is not 
surprising in a controversial matter such as this that the ruling (after being committed) failed 
to convince even the appeals court (which made the exceptional step of following the first 
appellate court instead of the Cour de cassation ).  Neither is it surprising that in France the 
question of the admissibility of wrongful life claims was eventually not decided by the 
judiciary, but by the legislature.  Of course, one can say that this is very much the French way 
of doing things, since it fits the model of the Trias Politica.  This is true, but one can hardly 
maintain that this contributes to the legitimacy of the Cour de cassation.  As the case of the 
ECHR has shown, the social, moral and political role a court plays can be of crucial 
importance for its legitimacy.  A lack of social relevance can be damaging for judicial 
legitimacy.  When the Cour de cassation aspires to be a relevant institution in present day 
French society it has to reconsider its ways of dealing with important questions like this.  
Otherwise it runs the risk of being marginalized.  On a more abstract level, the French case 
illustrates the extent to which legitimacy depends on functional variables.  This vindicates the 
extension of Lasser’s approach to embrace functionality. 
What about the Hoge Raad ruling in the case of baby Kelly?  The extensively reasoned 
judgement was far more convincing than those of the Cour de cassation, but in comparison 
with the ruling of the Californian court some weaknesses remained.  First, though the 
decision was supported by reasoning, this was done in only in one voice (because there were 
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no concurring or dissenting opinions).  Therefore the ruling does not reflect the diversity of 
opinions that exist in society when considering such a controversial matter like this, as does 
the Californian ruling did, because it allowed dissents.  As has been explained this seems a 
serious drawback, both from the perspective of democracy and of transparency.  The Hoge 
Raad succeeded in fulfilling its role as a moral/legal guide for public debate, but more in the 
manner of Plato’s “king philosopher.” In a modern society the moral role of a court such as 
the Hoge Raad will be more relevant if it reflects the diversity of opinions in society within 
the court itself.  Second, though the ruling in the case of baby Kelly did refer to the moral 
principle of the dignity of human life, it did not really succeed in integrating this principle in 
the legal reasoning.  What do I mean by this?  As has been mentioned, the Hoge Raad 
sustained the claim of the parents (both on their own accord and in the name of Kelly), and 
did not consider this a violation of the principle of the dignity of human life.  On the contrary, 
the Hoge Raad concluded that sustaining the claim would better serve that purpose, but 
putting Kelly in a better position to lead a bearable life.  This is a truism, of course, but it 
misses the point of the argument.  In making this suggestion, the Hoge Raad transforms the 
argument from a general principle that justifies a legal decision into a specific goal that is 
realised by a legal decision.  As such it justifies too much, implying that every claim must be 
sustained, because this will put the complainant in a better position to lead a fulfilling human 
life).  The Hoge Raad made this mistake because it addressed this moral principle directly, 
without the mediation of legal sources.  Where the Cour de cassation was too exclusive, 
refusing to consider the moral merits of the case, the Hoge Raad was too inclusive.  The first 
approach is not convincing in a case with such important moral overtones as this one, the 
second case is not convincing in a society which is so morally divided as ours.  Both 




Where does this leave us?  After introducing the case of wrongful life we considered the 
sources from which different courts draw their legitimacy in dealing with hard cases such as 
this.  First, we contrasted the rather formalized, short, syllogistic, magisterial decisions of the 
French Cour de cassation, with the pragmatic, long, dialogical, personal decisions of the US 
Supreme Court justices.  The French system seems to rely on input-factors as dominant 
sources for judicial legitimacy (institutional legitimacy), while the Supreme Court draws its 
legitimacy from discursive means (discursive legitimacy).  This situation is strengthened by a 
different organisation of the debate.  The French system displays a bifurcation with an 
emphasis on the unofficial discourse as the context for the real debate, while in the American 
system the debate takes place within the court itself (as is shown by majority and minority 
opinions).  For Europeans the difference is relevant, because the French system is mimicked 
in the ECJ, while the American system is copied by the ECHR.  As has been argued, the 
latter system seems preferable in a modern democracy, where substantive justice and social 
elitism have given way to procedural justice and meritocracy.  
The European courts seem to take in-between positions, as they each display a unique 
mixture of output- and input-legitimacy.  The ECJ has built up a legal system based on the 
EU Treaties, interpreting them and other EU provisions in a Dworkinian fashion in the best 
possible way to advance European integration.  As Bengoetxea writes, “the ECJ has ‘une 
certaine idée de l’Europe.’” The consequence is that the legitimacy of the ECJ is connected 
with the European integration as a whole, which is not without risk, as recent developments 
show.  The ECHR has developed a human rights discourse on the basis of the Treaty of Rome 
(1950), also interpreting it in a Dworkinian fashion.  Its activism has been more successful 
than that of the ECJ, because the topics dealt with speak more to the mind (are less 
technocratic), have had a large positive impact on the legal systems of the Member States..  
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The legitimacy of the ECHR is not to be taken for granted however, because the Court has 
serious problems both with caseload and compliance. Finally, there is the issue of national 
representation among the judges appointed in the courts, which is a serious risk for the 
legitimacy of both European courts.    
The Dutch Hoge Raad takes another in-between position between the opposites of the Cour 
de cassation and the US Supreme Court.  On the one hand, the institutional setting is copied 
from the French example, including the bifurcation between the official and the unofficial 
discourse.  On the other hand, the Hoge Raad seeks legitimacy by improving the reasoning of 
the decisions, apparently aspiring to resemble the American courts.  The resemblances and 
differences are illustrated by the way the different courts have dealt with wrongful life 
claims.  As has been mentioned the rulings of the Cour de cassation and the California 
Supreme Court could not differ more in content and style.  Again, the Hoge Raad takes the 
middle ground and draws from both institutional and discursive sources of legitimacy. 
Finally, the question can be asked how to improve or strengthen the Courts’ legitimacy?  
This review of the issues surrounding legitimacy suggests that strengthening legitimacy will 
require improvement both in the input and output of the courts.  On the input side, the 
possibility of political appointments creates a serious reason for concern about the California 
Supreme Court (as well as the US Supreme Court).  For the Cour de cassation and the Hoge 
Raad, it is the elitist character of the court that attracts attention.  The selection on merit 
creates risks for the representative nature of the courts and can be questioned from a 
democratic point of view.  Though the risks for the American and these European courts 
mirror each other, they will both need to be aware of the risks they run on the input side.  On 
top of that, the Cour de cassation and (to a lesser extent) the Hoge Raad have to improve 
their performance (on the output side).  The example of the “wrongful life” case shows that 
the Hoge Raad does reasonably well but could improve by introducing a practice of 
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concurring and dissenting opinions.  The Cour de cassation though has performed rather 
poorly in the cases of Nicolas Perruche and seriously faces the risk of marginalization.  For 
all courts discussed we can conclude that their legitimacy forms a serious challenge.  In 
reflecting on this we should integrate the institutional, discursive and social dimensions of the 
problem.  Only then can we aspire to improve the legitimacy of our courts.         
